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The introduction of unemployment insurance is usually thought to increase
welfare if workers are su¢ ciently risk averse. We analyse the e⁄ects of in-
troducing mandatory unemployment insurance in the shirking model. Sur-
prisingly, we ￿nd that introducing unemployment insurance reduces welfare
irrespective of the degree of risk aversion.
JEL-class.: J0, J3, H1
Key Words: E¢ ciency Wages, Shirking, Unemployment Insurance1 Introduction
The standard justi￿cation for the introduction of unemployment insurance
is based on the idea that workers are risk averse. For instance, Holmlund
(1998) uses a search model to show that positive unemployment bene￿ts
are optimal if workers are risk averse.1 It is the purpose of this paper to
show that, surprisingly, this result does not carry over to another standard
labour market model, the shirking model, originally developed by Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984).2 The reason is that a high degree of risk aversion does
not only increase the bene￿ts from unemployment compensation but also
the costs in terms of negative incentives. If unemployment insurance makes
unemployed workers much better o⁄, it also reduces the incentives to provide
e⁄ort. In order to preserve e⁄ort, unemployment must increase. The higher
the bene￿t from the introduction of unemployment compensation, the higher
the increase in unemployment required to preserve e⁄ort. Our analysis shows
that the second e⁄ect dominates the ￿rst. To our knowledge, although the
role of unemployment insurance in the shirking model did receive some atten-
tion in the debate following the publication of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984),3
the fundamental issue of whether or not mandatory unemployment insur-
ance is desirable if risk aversion is introduced into this model has not been
investigated.4
1For similar conclusions in search models see also Mortensen (1983) and Acemoglu and
Shimer (1999).
2Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), page 441, claim but do not show explicitly that "Clearly
the social optimum involves [a mandatory minimum bene￿t level of] ￿ w > 0 if risk aversion
is great enough." As the following analysis shows, this claim is not correct.
3See for example Bull (1985) and Carmichael (1985).
4The impact of unemployment insurance on employment and wages in shirking models
with risk neutral workers has, for example, been analysed by Chatterji and Sparks (1991)
1A limiting assumption of the original Shapiro-Stiglitz-model is that the
e⁄ort standard is given exogenously. One may ask whether our result is an
artefact of this assumption. We therefore extend the model by endogenizing
the e⁄ort level following Rasmussen (2002). It turns out that our main result,
the negative welfare e⁄ect of mandatory unemployment insurance does not
change. The paper is set up as follows. In section 2, we analyse the e⁄ects of
introducing unemployment insurance in the original Shapiro-Stiglitz-model,
the only di⁄erence being that we consider risk averse, rather than risk neutral
workers. We distinguish between the short and the long run by allowing entry
and exit of ￿rms only in the long run.5 In section 3, we endogenize the e⁄ort
level. Section 4 concludes.
2 The shirking model with risk averse work-
ers
Assume that there are N identical risk averse workers in the economy. The
instantaneous utility of an employed worker is u(w) ￿ g(e) where u(w) is
increasing and strictly concave in wage income per period w and g(e) is
increasing and convex in the level of e⁄ort e6 and g(0) = 0. Workers choose
as well as by Albrecht and Vroman (1996) and Albrecht and Vroman (1999).
5As Goerke (2002) points out, the outcome of an e¢ ciency wage model consistently
di⁄ers quite strongly in the short-run and the long-run perspective. Therefore, we also
follow the extension of the Shapiro-Stiglitz-model by Albrecht and Vroman (1996) and
allow for entry and exit of ￿rms to investigate the long-run welfare e⁄ects of unemployment
insurance.
6The convexity assumption will assure that the ￿rst order condition of the ￿rms￿pro￿t
maximisation problem describes a maximum even in the case of a linear production tech-
nology and risk neutrality of workers. In the original version of the model by Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984), instantaneous utility is speci￿ed with g(e) = e, so that g00(e) = 0. The
2between two e⁄ort level: they either take the high value e = ￿ e > 0 or the
low one e = 0: The instantaneous utility of an unemployed worker is u(￿ w),
where ￿ w is a transfer the unemployed worker receives from his last employer.7
Each worker maximizes the discounted value of expected lifetime utility. The
discount rate is denoted by r.
There is an exogenous job destruction rate b which may cause workers to
be dismissed irrespective of the e⁄ort level they choose. In addition, a worker
who spends zero e⁄ort is detected and dismissed for shirking with probability
q.
The expected lifetime utility of an employed worker who spends e⁄ort
(V e) is given by the equation
rV
e = u(w) ￿ g(￿ e) + b(V
u ￿ V
e): (1)
where V u is the expected lifetime utility of an unemployed worker. For an
employed worker who spends zero e⁄ort, we have
rV
n = u(w) + (b + q)(V
u ￿ V
n): (2)
Workers will choose the high e⁄ort level if and only if V e ￿ V n. Each ￿rm
and each worker takes the utility of the unemployed as given. Combining (1)
generalization has no in￿ uence on the results in this chapter.
7We follow Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) by assuming that ￿rms directly pay bene￿ts to
workers. Assuming that bene￿ts are ￿nanced by a tax per employee paid by ￿rms would
not change the results. This issue will be discussed further below.
3and (2) yields the high e⁄ort condition
u(w) ￿ g(￿ e) ￿ rV




There is a given number of M identical risk neutral ￿rms in the economy.
They produce a homogenous good y using e⁄ective labour as the only factor
of production. Each employed worker provides e units of e⁄ective labour per
unit of time. If all workers in a ￿rm choose the high e⁄ort level ￿ e, the input
in terms of e⁄ective labour is L = n￿ e, where n is the number of employed
workers. The production function is F(L), with FL > 0 and FLL < 0:
Firms are price takers in the output market and the price of y is given and
normalized to unity.
The unemployment insurance system consists of unemployment bene￿ts
￿ w which ￿rms have to pay to each dismissed worker during the time the
worker is unemployed. The expected cost per dismissed worker ￿ W is given
by
r ￿ W = ￿ w ￿ a ￿ W;
where a is the probability of exit from unemployment.8 The pro￿t of a ￿rm
8Note that the considered unemployment insurance system is completely experience-
rated. Alternatively, ￿ W can be interpreted as a mandatory severance payment to dismissed
employees. If the unemployment contributions a ￿rm has to pay depend on the number of
workers dismissed by the ￿rm, as assumed here (following Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)), the
question arises whether the threat of a ￿rm to dismiss workers caught shirking is credible.
Since all workers are homogeneous, the ￿rm knows that workers replacing those who are
dismissed are of the same type. Thus, if there are layo⁄ costs, the ￿rm will be better
o⁄ by keeping workers although they are caught shirking. In our analysis, this is not
problematic because the results of the model would not change if we assumed that ￿rms
had to pay unemployment contributions in the form of a tax per employee, independent
of the number of workers the ￿rm lays o⁄. In this case, the tax which balances the budget
of the unemployment insurance system would be equal to b ￿ W. An e¢ ciency wage model
with heterogenous workers, which allows to study layo⁄ costs, is developed in Fath and
4per unit of time is
￿ = F(L) ￿ wn ￿ bn ￿ W ￿ k
where k represents a ￿xed cost of running a ￿rm. The ￿rst order condition
for the ￿rm·s maximization problem is
@￿
@n
= FL(L)￿ e ￿ w ￿ b ￿ W = 0: (4)
The labour market equilibrium is characterized as follows. The expected
lifetime utility of an unemployed worker is given by
rV
u = u(￿ w) + a(V
e ￿ V
u) (5)
where a is the probability of exit from unemployment. In a steady state,
the in￿ ow of workers to the pool of unemployed, bnM, equals the number of





Using (3), (5) and (6), we can now derive the aggregate high e⁄ort condition,
which is given by
u(w) ￿ g(￿ e) ￿ u(￿ w) ￿ g(￿ e)




5Using (6) in (4) yields




Equations (7) and (8) determine the steady state values of n and w,
for given values of ￿ w. Standard comparative static analysis leads to the










































If the production technology converges to linearity (FLL(L) ! 0), ￿rms make
zero pro￿ts and an increase in unemployment bene￿ts can only be ￿nanced
by a wage reduction. If there are pro￿ts, the cost of providing unemployment
bene￿ts is partly shifted to pro￿t income. The possible wage increase arises
from the aggregate high e⁄ort condition in (7). According to that, a rise
in unemployment compensation pushes e¢ ciency wages upwards to sustain
incentives to work. If the marginal utility of income of the unemployed
is su¢ ciently high (consider u0(￿ w) ! 1 as an extreme case), the positive
incentive e⁄ect dominates the negative labour cost e⁄ect on wages.
62.1 Short-run welfare e⁄ects of introducing mandatory
unemployment insurance
In a laisser faire equilibrium, ￿rms would not pay unemployment bene￿ts to
workers. But would a mandatory introduction of transfers to the unemployed
increase welfare? Let us ￿rst examine the impact on the expected utilities of


















which shows that in equilibrium a constant gap
g(￿ e)
q between the two utility
values guarantees workers￿provision of e⁄ort. Obviously, expected utility of
both groups will rise, if the introduction of unemployment insurance leads
to an increase in equilibrium wages. But at the same time there arises a
negative employment e⁄ect which expands the group of the unemployed who
face lower expected utility. To account for the negative employment e⁄ect, we
use the following utilitarian welfare function as a criterion for social welfare
W of workers9
W = MnV
e + (N ￿ Mn)V
u: (13)
9The qualitative results do not change if we include pro￿ts into the welfare analysis
by assuming that workers and ￿rm owners are the same individuals and the income per
worker also contains pro￿t income ￿M
N :
7Using (11), (12) and their derivatives, the welfare e⁄ect of a change in ￿ w,














Note again that, since
d(Mn)
d ￿ w < 0, (14) implies that a positive welfare e⁄ect
of increasing ￿ w can only emerge if the wage rate increases, which requires


































2FLL(L) < 0 (15)
which, obviously, may be violated for any degree of workers￿risk aversion.
It is easy to check that, if the marginal utility of income of the unemployed
approaches in￿nity (u0(￿ w) ! 1), (15) is necessary and su¢ cient for a posi-
tive welfare e⁄ect. If (15) holds, workers may bene￿t from the introduction
of unemployment bene￿ts. But this is only possible if FLL(L) < 0, which
implies that there are positive pro￿ts in equilibrium. In this case, workers
may bene￿t from the introduction of unemployment insurance because the
cost of ￿nancing the bene￿ts is at least partly shifted to ￿rms, not because
8workers are risk averse.10
These ￿ndings may be summarized in the following
Proposition 1 In the short run, a marginal increase in mandatory unem-
ployment bene￿ts, departing from the laisser faire equilibrium with ￿ w = 0,
1. reduces the welfare of workers, irrespective of the degree of risk aversion,
if FLL(L) ! 0 and
2. reduces the welfare of workers, if M ￿ e
q + N
r u0(w)￿ e2FLL(L) ￿ 0 and
FLL(L) < 0.
2.2 Long-run welfare e⁄ects of introducing mandatory
unemployment insurance
In the long-run perspective, ￿rms may enter or leave the market so that the
equilibrium will be characterized by a zero pro￿t condition:
￿ = F(L) ￿ wn ￿ bn
￿ w
a(n;M) + r
￿ k = 0: (16)
(16) together with (4) implies that average employment costs w + b ￿ w
a+r re-











10If there are positive pro￿ts, social welfare would have to take into account the utility
of ￿rm owners. It is straightforward to show that pro￿ts never increase in response to
an increase in bene￿ts, so that the negative welfare e⁄ects of increasing bene￿ts are only
exacerbated if pro￿ts are taken into account.
9The reason is that there are no pro￿ts which could ￿nance higher e¢ ciency
wages after unemployment insurance is introduced. The wage reduction is
induced by the exit of ￿rms which reduces employment in the economy as a
whole. High e⁄ort can be maintained despite increasing bene￿ts and decreas-
ing wages because some ￿rms exit the market and the rate of unemployment
increases.
The welfare e⁄ect is stated in
Proposition 2 A marginal increase in mandatory unemployment bene￿ts,
departing from the laisser faire equilibrium with ￿ w = 0, unambiguously re-
duces the welfare of workers in the long run, irrespective of the degree of risk
aversion.
Proof. See the appendix.
As a consequence of lower employment and wages, both expected utilities
and welfare as presented in (11) - (13) unambiguously decrease. This result is
in line with proposition 1.1 and can be ascribed to the zero pro￿t condition.
3 The shirking model with endogenous e⁄ort
As has become clear in the previous analysis, the change in the e¢ ciency
wage plays an important role for the welfare e⁄ects of unemployment insur-
ance. Obviously, the results are limited by the fact that the required e⁄ort
standard of ￿rms is exogenously given. Demanding a higher performance
level respectively enhancing the productivity of the employees may be a pos-
sibility for the ￿rms to balance higher employment costs. In this chapter we
10therefore investigate the implications of endogenising e⁄ort for the e⁄ects of
unemployment insurance. We stick to the long run version of the model, i.e.
we allow for entry and exit of ￿rms. We will extend the model of the previ-
ous section in the following way: Like in Rasmussen (2000), a representative
￿rm is now able to choose the e⁄ort standard ￿ e. This choice in￿ uences the
wage setting of the ￿rm via the high e⁄ort condition in (3). If (3) describes
the implicit function !(w; ￿ e), the change in the e¢ ciency wage induced by a





g0(￿ e)(r + b + q)
qu0(w)
> 0: (18)
The ￿rst order conditions of the ￿rm now are given by (4) and
@￿
@￿ e
= nFL(L) ￿ nwe = 0 (19)
where the ￿rm takes into account the required changes in w according to (18).
From (4) and (19) one can derive a modi￿ed version of the Solow condition
of e¢ ciency wages which implies that ￿rms maximise pro￿ts by equalising
the variable costs per e¢ ciency unit and the marginal cost of e⁄ort




According to equation (20) a single ￿rm will raise the e⁄ort standard to bal-
ance an increase in unemployment bene￿ts taking into account the necessary
wage increase.
In the long run, the equilibrium values of w, ￿ e, n and M for any given
11level of ￿ w are identi￿ed by (4), (7), (16) and (19).
3.1 Mandatory unemployment insurance
The introduction of mandatory unemployment insurance now has the follow-
ing e⁄ects:
Proposition 3 If the e⁄ort standard is set by ￿rms, a marginal increase
in mandatory unemployment bene￿ts, departing from the laisser faire equi-
librium with ￿ w = 0, unambiguously reduces employment and increases the
e⁄ort standard in the long run. Wages will decline.
Proof. See the appendix.
For given wages and e⁄ort, an increase in ￿ w increases the cost per worker
faced by ￿rms, and pro￿ts become negative. In order to restore zero pro￿ts,
e⁄ort must increase and/or wages must decline. This is only compatible with
the no shirking condition if unemployment increases. and ￿rms leave the
market. The number of operating ￿rms and, hence, the level of employment
will decline until the zero pro￿t condition is satis￿ed.
3.2 Welfare e⁄ects of introducing mandatory unem-
ployment insurance
How does the introduction of mandatory unemployment insurance now a⁄ect
welfare? Overall welfare is again given by W = MnV e + (N ￿ Mn)V u: As
can easily be checked by di⁄erentiating (11) and (12), expected utilities of
both employed and unemployed workers decline with decreasing wages and
12increasing e⁄ort. Moreover, if the e⁄ort level increases, the gap between the
utilities of employed and unemployed workers V e ￿ V u =
g(￿ e)
q must widen.
Finally, the overall welfare e⁄ect accounts for rising unemployment and is
stated in
Proposition 4 A marginal increase in mandatory unemployment bene￿ts,
departing from the laisser faire equilibrium with ￿ w = 0 where the e⁄ort stan-
dard is endogenously determined, unambigously reduces the welfare of workers
in the long run.
Proof. See the appendix.
4 Conclusions
Risk aversion is commonly thought to be su¢ cient as a justi￿cation for the
introduction of mandatory unemployment insurance. This paper shows that,
in the shirking model as introduced by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) as well as
in the extended version with endogenous e⁄ort, risk aversion increases not
only the bene￿t of unemployment insurance but also the cost in the form
of high unemployment. If a su¢ cient part of the burden of unemployment
insurance can be shifted to pro￿ts, the introduction of unemployment insur-
ance may increase the welfare of workers at the expense of ￿rm owners. But
in this case, the positive e⁄ect on the welfare of workers does not depend on
the degree of risk aversion. In the long run, where pro￿ts are zero, however,
the introduction of unemplyoment insurance unambiguously reduces worker
welfare, irrespective of the degree of risk aversion. The reason is that a very
high marginal utility of income of the unemployed implies that the welfare
13gain from transfers to the unemployed is high, but the negative incentive
e⁄ect of the transfer is also high. Therefore, the increase in unemployment
required to maintain e⁄ort is also very high.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 2
Equations (7), (8) and (16) determine the steady state values of w, n, and







2 (Mdn + ndM) ￿ u
0(￿ w)d￿ w = 0 (A.1)








d￿ w = 0: (A.3)
>From (21) we already derived dw
d ￿ w < 0 in (17). From inserting (21) into
(21) it follows that dn
d ￿ w = 0. Equation (21) then shows that employment
must decline with increasing unemployment bene￿ts:
d(Mn)
d ￿ w = ndM
d ￿ w < 0. The
change in welfare is given by (14). Given that employment and wages decline,
the welfare e⁄ect is unambiguously negative.
q.e.d.
14Proof of proposition 3
Total di⁄erentiation of (4), (7), (16) and (19) with respect to w, ￿ e, n, M and
￿ w departing from ￿ w = 0 yields
u0(w)dw ￿
g0(￿ e)





(N￿Mn)2 (Mdn + ndM) ￿ u0(￿ w)d￿ w
= 0 (A.4)















d￿ e + ￿ enFLLdn = 0 (A.6)
￿ndw + nFLd￿ e ￿
nb
a + r














Inserting (21) into (21) yields
￿ enFLLd￿ e + ￿ e
2FLLdn = 0 (A.8)
which implies dn
d￿ e = ￿n
￿ e < 0. Substituting (A.8) into (21) and rearranging
yields dw
d￿ e < 0. The last result together with (21) implies d￿ e
d ￿ w > 0 so that
dn
d ￿ w < 0 and dw
d ￿ w < 0. Finally, the result that employment decreases with

























0(￿ w) < 0
q.e.d.
15Proof of proposition 4
Welfare is given by
W = MnV
e + (N ￿ Mn)V
u:
Using (11) and (12), W can be written as
W = NV











￿ (N ￿ Mn)
g(￿ e)
q
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